Most of the fortification was done piecemeal, by different federal agencies for different purposes, scattered throughout the city. More barriers were added after the 1998 bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. (10) Many of these barriers were hastily erected as `temporary' antiterrorist measures after the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, when it became clear that small trucks could be used as high-explosive car bombs. Since the mid-1990s there has been an ``alarming proliferation of unsightly and makeshift security measures'' in DC and specifically on the National Mall (NCPC, 2002, page iii). As such, fortifications to and restrictions of this public space are antithetical to its symbolic role in national discourse. Concerns over the loss of civil liberties, restrictions to public access of public space, and the implied messages of a new hypersecurity-oriented Mall reveal that fear and fortification have dominated at the expense of protecting public access and preserving the Mall's iconography. Additionally, there are those who are concerned that fortification of the Mall will fundamentally change the symbolic space as much as the physical space. Such fortressing and restrictions to public space may result in the erosion of civil liberties. The security plans for the Mall, however, did not engage this process rather they were fast-tracked as a response to urgent threats to `national security'. In theory, changes to federal public space, such as the Mall, should involve significant public input through an open planning process. Some of these changes are visible (the fortressing of monuments and memorials) some are invisible (CCTV on the Mall, for example). September 11 has given urgency and legitimacy to overt fortressing of `at risk' sites the National Mall is a good example. Many counterterrorist responses amount to little more than extensions of ongoing trends (Coaffee, 2004). Washington, DC is frequently under `Code Orange', although most of the public has little understanding of what this means beyond the inconvenience of additional street closures. For example, the Department of Homeland Security's Color Codes have been at best an enigmatic disappointment which imply an impending terrorist strike, but provide little in the way of steps to protect oneself. These hypersecurity measures are often quickly approved, but are not necessarily effective. In this paper I describe this impulse to implement intense and often intrusive security measures as `hypersecurity' to suggest that anything designed to protect people and spaces has been given instant legitimacy when associated with the phrases `national security' or `war on terrorism'. The responses have been highly intense and visible counterterrorist measures. Since September 11, 2001, however, it is clear that symbolic targetsösuch as monuments, memorials, landmark buildings, and other important public spacesöare increasingly at risk. Since the 1990s terrorists have focused on economic infrastructure and financial zones as a result so did many counterterrorism measures. Terrorists now target global cities to attract global media publicity (Coaffee, 2004, page 201).

Reconceptualized ideas about terrorism have led to new and dramatic urban counterresponses. Up until the early 1990s, many cities had no comprehensive security and defensive strategy attempts to design out terrorism occurred specific target by specific target and often after an event raised the issue or highlighted vulnerability, or after a direct threat was made (9).

Commentators have discussed the costs and benefits of adopting counterterrorism measures in the face of real or perceived terrorist threats (Brown, 1985 Coaffee, 2003 Davis, 1998 Graham, 2002 Pawley, 1998). When security measures are particularly visible in capital cities, such as Washington, DC, the symbolic impact of fortress architecture is elevated to represent a national discourse of war, fear, and entrenchment.

This is happening in other cities around the worldöNew York, London, Los Angeles, and Tokyo, for example, where bollards, bunkers, and other barriers have been placed around selected `high-risk' targets and buildings. but it is unclear how the need for improving security translates into accept- able levels of fortification and loss of public access to public space.

Jersey barrier